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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOEL SCOTT McNEARNEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20090463-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a conviction for one count of burglary, a second felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2008), in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- 103(2)(j)
(2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
I.

Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict to amend

the second degree burglary of a dwelling offense to a third degree burglary of a building,
where the structure at issue did not meet the statutory definition of a "dwelling."
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed
verdict is a question of law reviewed for correctness "giving no particular deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ^ 15, 167 P.3d
503(citation omitted). Whether the trial court properly interpreted a statutory term is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^ 14, 127 P.3d
682.
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict.
R. 124:98-102, 148-49.
II.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of

burglary of a building, a third degree felony, denying Mr. McNearney his right to present
to the jury his theory of the case.
Standard of Review: "When considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser
included offense jury instruction, [this Court will] 'view the evidence and the inferences
that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense.5" State v. Spillers,
2007 UT 13, Tf 10, 152 P.3d 315 (citation omitted). Furthermore, when a lesser included
offense instruction is requested by defense, "the requirements for inclusion of the
instruction 'should be liberally construed."9 Id. (citation omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved. R. 124:147-50.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. McNearney was charged by Information on January 17, 2008 with burglary, a
second degree felony; theft, a class B misdemeanor; and, unlawful possession of burglary
tools, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3. A preliminary hearing was held on April 22, 2008
where Mr. McNearney was bound over on all counts. R. 23-24; 30:52. The trial court
2

granted defense counsel's motion in limine to exclude evidence of Mr. McNearney's
prior criminal record. R. 63-66; 124:1-6. On March 4, 2009, a jury trial was held. R.
124. The state and defense counsel stipulated to the admissibility of "a bag with some
tools . . . and evidence of some toilet screw caps, a key, and also evidence . . . alleging"
the key was stolen. R. 124:6. Based on the stipulation, the state dismissed the theft and
unlawful possession of burglary tools charges. R. 124:6.
At the conclusion of the state's case, defense counsel made a motion for a directed
verdict to change the burglary of a dwelling count, a second degree felony, to burglary of
a building, a third degree felony. R. 124:98. The trial court denied the motion. R.
124:102. The trial court also denied defense counsel's request to give the lesser included
jury instruction of burglary of a building. R. 70; 124:148-50. The trial court refused to
allow defense counsel to argue to the jury that Mr. McNearney did not enter into a
"dwelling" as defined by statute. R. 124:150-53.
The jury found Mr. McNearney guilty of second degree burglary. R. 60, 10507; 124:197. On May 1, 2009, Mr. McNearney was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
not less than one year and no more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. R. 113-14.
The trial court suspended the prison sentence and placed Mr. McNearney on supervised
probation for 36 months with Adult Probation and Parole. R. 113-14. On May 28, 2009,
a timely notice of appeal was filed. R. 115-16.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Joel McNearney was charged with burglary, a second degree felony; theft, a
class B misdemeanor; and, unlawful possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor.
R. 1-3. A jury trial was held on March 4, 2009. R. 124.
Brent Roberts, testified that he had built a house next door to the home he was
living in and had placed it on the market for sale. R. 124:29, 41. The house had been on
the market for about four months and had a for sale sign out in front. R. 124:30, 41. The
house was located in a subdivision surrounded by "a lot of empty lots" with only a few
homes built at that time. R. 124:41. The area was undeveloped and sidewalks were not
put in at the time. R. 124:86, 88. The house contained a heating and cooling s>stem, and
standard appliances except for a refrigerator. R. 124:30. A key box was placed on the
front doorknob of the house for realtors to access when they were showing the house to
prospective buyers. R. 124:31.
On January 6, 2008, after going over to the house to turn on some lights, Mr.
Roberts noticed the key box was missing and the front doorknob had been smashed. R.
124:31. Mr. Roberts reported the missing key box to the police. R. 124:32. Officer
Kevin Peck came out to the house around 7:00 p.m. and walked through the house with
Mr. Roberts and they determined that nothing had been damaged or disturbed. R. 124:32,
45-46. Officer Peck left Mr. Roberts his card and told him to call if he saw anything
suspicious. R. 124:33, 46. After talking with his son, Mr. Roberts decided to put a baby
monitor in the house so he would hear if anything happened. R. 124:33,46-47. The
baby monitor was place in the kitchen at the rear of the house on top of a cupboard. R.
4

124:42. At about 9:30 p.m. that same night Mr. Roberts heard doors opening, "stuff
moving around," and voices coming from inside the house on the baby monitor. R.
124:34. Mr. Roberts called Officer Peck and told him that he could hear voices inside the
house. R. 124:36, 47.
Officer Chris Combs was the first to arrive at the house and he and Mr. Roberts
entered the house. R. 124:36, 49, 93. Officer Peck advised Combs that he would try to
get a visual of the back of the house. R. 124:50. Once Peck could see the back of the
house, he noticed two figures wearing dark clothing beginning to run from the house. R.
124:51, 93. Peck notified Combs and other officers responding to the area that two
individuals were running from the back of the house. R. 124:51, 93. Peck pursued the
individuals first in his vehicle and then on foot. R. 124:52-53, 93. Eventually, Peck was
able to yell out "police" and give commands to the individual closest to him, Joel, to get
down on the ground. R. 124:56. Joel responded to Peck's commands and was arrested.
R. 124:56-57. Officers were unable to locate the second individual. R. 124:64. Upon
searching Joel, Peck found a set of keys, a single key, a headlamp, cell phone, his
identification and white plastic caps. R. 124:58, 60-61, 123-24. At the house, Officer
Peck also found a bag of tools, consistent with tools use for burglaries, about 20 feet from
the back of the house that appeared to have been dropped. R. 124:70-74. Peck asked
Officer Combs to take the key found on Joel back to the house and see if it unlocked the
front door, which it did. R. 124:94-95.
Mr. Roberts testified that when he entered the house he could see the sliding door
at the back of the house was open. R. 124:36. As Mr. Roberts and Officer Combs
5

entered the master bathroom, they could see that the toilet had been removed off of the
pipe and there were nuts and bolts lying on the floor. R. 124:36-37, 39, 94. In another
bathroom it appeared that the toilet had just started to be removed. R. 124:37, 39. The
toilet screw caps were missing from the master bathroom but not from the other
bathroom. R. 124:38-40.
After the state rested, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict to
change count I from burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony to burglary of a
building a third degree felony. R. 124:98. Defense counsel argued that because this
house had never been occupied it did not fit within the statutory definition of a dwelling.
R. 124:98-99, 101-02. The trial court denied the motion. R. 124:102.
Next, Joel testified that he was employed doing remodeling type of construction
which consists of upgrading homes, from sheetrock to plumbing, and all the fixtures. R.
124:103-04. Joel worked with a guy named Preston, serving as his AA sponsor for six
months, and occasionally allowing Preston to work as a laborer for him on his
construction projects. R. 124:107-08. Preston worked with Joel on his current
construction project and Preston told Joel that he had a couple of toilets to finish the
house they were working on. R. 124:109-10. Joel went to Preston's to pick up the toilets
and Preston told him that he needed a ride to pick the toilets up. R. 124:110. Although
Joel was suspicious of Preston's claim when they arrived at the house, Preston told Joel
that the toilets were legitimate. R. 124:112.
Preston told Joel to wait for him at the back door while he went to the front of the
house and let himself inside. R. 124:113. Preston then opened the back door and told
6

Joel to come inside, but Joel refused. R. 124:117. Joel told Preston he wanted to leave
but Preston told him to relax, that it was all right. R. 124:118. Preston continued to talk
to Joel but Joel could not see Preston inside the house because it was dark. R. 124:120,
135. At some point Preston came out of the house in a hurry yelling "police," and "the
cops are here," and ran into Joel waiting at the back door. R. 124:121-22, 138. Preston
handed Joel some things which he put in his pockets as he panicked and started to follow
after Preston. R. 124:121-22, 139. When Joel heard the police officer tell him to stop,
Joel stopped and did as the officer directed him to do. R. 124:123. Joel was placed into
custody and searched. Officers found among other personal items, toilet caps and the key
to the front door of the house. R. 124:123-24.
After the defense rested, the trial court addressed counsel, outside the presence of
the jury, regarding a defense proposed jury instruction it would not give. R. 70; 124:147.
First, the trial court indicated that it denied the motion for directed verdict based on its
interpretation of case law that the statute does not require "that a dwelling actually be
inhabited, only that the purpose for which the dwelling is created is that it be habitable."
R. 124:148. Defense counsel objected to the trial court's interpretation of "usually
occupied" under the statute. R. 124:149. Based on the trial court's interpretation of the
statute, it denied defense counsel's request for a lesser included instruction for burglary, a
third degree felony. R. 124:149. The trial court also denied defense counsel's request to
give a lesser included jury instruction on criminal trespass, R. 124:150. The trial court
also denied defense counsel the ability to argue to the jury that the house in question did

7

not meet the statutory definition of a dwelling. R. 124:150-53. The trial court instructed
the jury on its interpretation of a dwelling and the term "usually occupied." R. 124:167.
The jury convicted Mr. McNearney of burglary, a second degree felony. R.
60; 124:197. The trial court sentenced Mr. McNearney to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year and no more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. R. 113-14.
The trial court suspended the prison sentence and place Mr. McNearney on supervised
probation for 36 months with Adult Probation and Parole. R. 113-14.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. McNearney's motion for a directed verdict to
amend the charged offense of burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, to burglary
of a building, a third degree felony. Under Utah law, a newly built vacant house that has
never been occupied as a residence does not fit the statutory definition of a "dwelling" as
that term is defined within the burglary statute. Rather, the statute and case law support
that a building becomes a dwelling house when it is occupied and used for the purpose of
sleeping. An uninhabited house simply does not implicate the same concerns for privacy
that the second degree burglary statute seeks to provide. The trial court's interpretation
of a "dwelling" was therefore erroneous and it erred in failing to grant the directed
verdict.
The trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of burglary
of a building and denied Mr. McNearney his right to argue that the house in question was
not a "dwelling" as that element is defined within the burglary statute, thus denying Mr.
McNearney his right to present the jury with his theory of the case. Mr. McNearney was
8

entitled to his requested lesser-included offense jury instruction where the elements for
the offenses of burglary of a dwelling and burglary of a building overlap and the evidence
provided a rational basis for the jury to acquit him of the greater offense and convict him
of the lesser. Because whether the house in this case was "dwelling" is an element that
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. McNearney had the right to present a
defense that the statutory element was not met. Failing to allow Mr. McNearney his right
to present his defense was prejudicial. The trial court's error requires this Court to
reverse and remand for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. The Trial Court Erred in Denying a Motion for a Directed Verdict
to Amend the Offense to a Third Degree Burglary of a Building Where the
Newly Built Structure at Issue Had Never Been Occupied and Thereby Did
Not Meet the Statutory Definition of a "Dwelling."
Under Utah law, a newly built structure that has never been lived in, although
constructed for the purpose of human habitation, does not fit the statutory definition of a
"dwelling" within the meaning of the burglary statute. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2) (2008); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202(2) (2008). The term "usually occupied" used to define a "dwelling" requires that a
person actually be presently occupying the house as a residence where they sleep at night,
regardless if they are currently present, or that they have occupied the residence in the
past with the intention of returning. Because no one had ever lived or slept in the house
at issue in this case, the structure had never become and was not a "dwelling" within the
meaning of the statute defining burglary in the second degree. See Utah Code Ann. § 769

6-202(2). Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict to
amend the offense to third degree burglary of a building.
When interpreting a statute and the terms within it, this Court first looks to the
plain meaning and presumes that "the legislature used each word advisedly and [will]
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v.
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^ 29, 127 P.3d 682 (citation omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(2) states that a "[b]urglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second
degree." Id. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2) defines a "dwelling" as "a building which is
usually occupied by a person lodging in the building at night, whether or not a person is
actually present. Id. (emphasis added). "The term 'usually occupied' refers to the
purpose for which the structure is used." Cox, 826 P.2d at 662. To fit within the
statutory definition, the structure must be "one in which people typically stay overnight."
Id. A newly erected vacant house that has not yet been occupied does not meet the
statutory definition of a dwelling. Rather, a structure "becomes a dwelling house when a
person occupies it and begins to use it regularly for the purpose of sleeping." 3 Charles
E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, §325 (15th ed. 1995) ("Wharton").
The purpose behind charging burglary of a dwelling as a more serious felony
offense is "to protect people while in places where they are likely to be living and
sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting property in buildings such as stores, business
offices, or garages." Cox, 826 P.2d at 662. When an individual closes their door, they
should be able to feel secure in their home. "This is particularly true at night because at
10

that time an occupant is most vulnerable—he is usually sleeping." Wharton, supra, §325.
However, the dangers the legislature sought to protect individuals from are not present to
the same extent when the structure is uninhabited. Entry into a newly built vacant
structure does not implicate the concerns for privacy, sanctity of home or the potential for
serious harm that the burglary of a dwelling statute sought to address.
The test for determining if [a] building is a "dwelling house" is whether "it
is used regularly as a place to sleep[,]" . . . [However,] "the mere fact that a
house was built for the purpose of serving as a place of human habitation,
and that it is entirely suitable therefor, will not be sufficient to qualify it as
a dwelling so far as the law is concerned. It is not such before the first
dweller has moved in nor after the last dweller has moved out with no
intention of returning . . . . "
Wallace v. State, 492 A.2d 970, 974 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (citation omitted).
In Cox, the defendant argued that a cabin occupied less than fifty percent of the
time was not a "dwelling" within the meaning of the burglary statute. Cox, 826 P.2d at
662. The cabin owner testified that although no one lived in the cabin on a daily basis he
spent two to three days a week there. Id at 658. In determining that the occasional use
cabin fit within the term "usually occupied," this Court stated "[i]f the structure is one in
which people typically stay overnight, it fits within the definition of dwelling under the
burglary statute." Id. at 662. In support of its definition that "usually occupied" means a
place where "people typically stay overnight," this Court cited the holding in a Michigan
case which determined that the similar term "occupied dwelling," "included a house
under construction in which the owner slept only on weekends and holidays, noting the
possibility of confrontation between the owner and an intruder." Id at 662 (citation
omitted). This is because the statute "is intended to protect people while in places where
11

they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight." Id.; see also State v. Hale, 2006 UT
App 4345 No. 20050461-CA, 2006 WL 2979732, at *3 (determining a motor home fits
within the statutory definition of burglary of a dwelling); State v. Gates, 2000 UT App
256, No. 990402-CA, 2000 WL 33244184, at *2 (holding a rented camping trailer
equipped and used for overnight lodging fit within the statutory definition of burglary of
a dwelling).
This Court's holding in Cox and subsequent decisions are in line with other states
that have determined burglary is "viewed as [a crime] against habitation5' and "an
occupant's temporary absence does not change the character of a structure from being a
dwelling house for purposes of the crime of burglary." Annotation, Occupant's absence
from residential structure as affecting nature of offense as burglary or breaking and
entering, 20 A.L.R.4th 349, §2 (2009) [hereinafter Occupant's absence]; Hale, 2006 UT
App 434 *4 (noting that second degree burglary seeks to "protect people . . .where they
are likely to be living and sleeping" whereas "burglary of a vehicle [intends] to protect
people's vehicles"); State v. Oakev, 2005 UT App 89, No. 20030751-CA, 2005 WL
434500, at * 1 (stating Cox holding that cabin used less than fifty percent of the time fit
the statutory definition of dwelling "was not dependent upon the amount of time the
cabin was occupied" but focused on "the purpose for which the structure is used.").
Instead, it is the occupant's intention to return to the structure, regardless of how long the
absence, that determines "whether the house retains its character as a dwelling house"
and whether a burglary has occurred. Occupant's absence, supra, §2.
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The second degree burglary statute requires that the structure "must be occupied as
a dwelling house and not merely suitable or intended for such purpose." Id.; see also
Wharton, §325. This intent that the house must be occupied as a dwelling and not just
suitable as such is evident in the statute's definition of "building." Utah Code Ann. §766-201(1). A "building" is statutorily defined in part as "any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, or
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons." Id The
plain meaning of this definition is that the legislature requires more from a structure than
merely being "adapted for overnight accommodation" in order for it to qualify as a
"dwelling." Instead, a building becomes a "dwelling" when it is actively being occupied
as such, even if just on an occasional basis. Id, But, where a vacant structure has never
been occupied and does not contain those accoutrements usual to habitation, it does not
fit within the statutory definition of a "dwelling."
For example, in Watson v. State, defendant was charged with burglary of an
unoccupied dwelling house. 179 So.2d 826 (Miss 1965). The house in question was
under construction, nearing completion. Id at 826-27. One of the co-defendants was a
carpenter who had been working on the building and told the defendant and other codefendant that there was a power saw inside the building that they could sell. Id at 827.
The defendants entered the building and took the saw. Id The court reversed, noting
that previous state case law established that a recently built house, currently vacant, and
never occupied as a dwelling house "was not a dwelling house within the meaning of the
statute defining burglary of a dwelling house." Id (citing Woods v. State, 191 So. 283
(Miss. 1939). Similarly, a nearly completed house designed for occupancy as a dwelling
13

but that had never been occupied as such before the saw was taken, did not meet the
definition of a dwelling under the statute. Id.; see also Melton v. State, 477 So.2d 942
(Miss. 1985) (holding directed verdict should have been granted where defendants could
not be convicted of burglary of a dwelling house where house under construction had not
become a dwelling house where it had never been occupied).
In Johns v. Commonwealth, the defendant argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support that the house he broke into was a dwelling house within the
meaning of the burglary statute. 675 S.E.2d 211 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). The house in
question was described as a "single family residence" and was in the process of being
remodeled. Id at 212. The owner intended to sell the home as an investment and it was
currently vacant, was completely unfurnished, and had never been lived in or slept in. Id
at 214-15. Defendant broke into the home taking "a tool belt, tape measures, a framing
hammer, levelers, a skill saw, and utility knives." Id. at 213. Defendant was convicted of
burglary of a dwelling house and appealed arguing that the house did not qualify as a
dwelling house under the statute. Id. Based on case law, the court stated that "in
determining whether a residence constitutes a 'dwelling house' is whether it is used for
habitation, such as sleeping and other usual activities of life, on at least an occasional
basis." Id at 214 (citing Rash v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. Ct. App.
1989) (holding house that no one had lived in or intended to occupy occasionally was not
a dwelling house)).
The court determined that given the totality of the circumstance the house was not
a dwelling house. Id. at 215. There was no evidence that the house was used for
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habitation, "[n]o one slept there or even used it for the other usual activities of life." Id.
There was "no evidence that anyone who had used the home for habitation had any
intention of resuming that use." Id Instead, the evidence showed that the owner owned
the structure "as a business investment—not for habitation. Id. at 214; see Starnes v.
Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Ky. 1980) (reasoning that house will cease to be
"usually occupied" at some point after owners had moved out and did not intend to
return); People v. Henry, 64 A.D.3d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (although owner had
moved out of house and listed it for sale, house maintained its dwelling status where it
contained family's personal belongs); Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. 1991)
(although owner had not slept in house for four months, house did not lose its status as a
dwelling where owner's furniture, clothing and food were kept and he went to house
everyday to pick up mail and occasionally watch television); Santistevan v. People, 494
P.2d 75 (Colo. 1972) (permanently vacated apartment was not "inhabited dwelling
house" within meaning of statute); Wallace v. State, 492 A.2d 970 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985) (apartment not dwelling where tenants had permanently vacated and owner had
never lived nor intended to live in the apartment).
The evidence in this case established that Mr. Roberts built two homes adjacent to
each other in a newly developed area—one of the homes he lived in as his residence, the
other he built to sell. R. 124:29, 41. The homes were surrounded by many empty lots,
and lacked fences and sidewalks. R. 124:86, 87, 88-89. Although basic appliances had
been placed in the house in question, it did not contain a refrigerator. R. 124:30, 32. The
house had been placed on the market about four months prior to January 2008, and had a
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for sale sign in front of it. R. 124:30, 41. Although the house was designed for
habitation, no evidence was presented that it had ever been occupied or slept in by the
owner. The house did not contain any furniture, beds, or food or contain those
accoutrements usual to habitation.
Because no one had ever occupied this home it does not meet the definition of a
"dwelling" under the statute. A vacant house does not implicate the concerns for privacy,
sanctity of home, or potential harm that the second degree burglary statute seeks to
address. The dangers raised by the burglary of a dwelling statute are not present to the
same extent when a house is uninhabited. Therefore, the trial court's interpretation of the
statutory definition of "dwelling" was erroneous and it erred in denying the motion for a
directed verdict to amend the offense to a third degree burglary of a building.
POINT II. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Instruct the Jury on the
Lesser Offense of Burglary of a Building Denying Mr. McNearney His Right
to Present the Jury With His Theory of the Case.
Encompassed in the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the facts of the case is the "right of defendant to have his theory of the case presented to
the jury in a clear and understandable way." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981);
see also State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985). "When an accused enters a
plea of not guilty, he has a right to have his entire case submitted to the [fact-finder]
unless he waives such right by expressly admitting at the trial the existence of some fact
or facts which is or are put in issue by the plea of not guilty." State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177,
181 (Utah 1931); Rock v. Arkansas. 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987) (Defendant's collective
right to present a defense is rooted in the Sixth Amendment's confrontation and
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compulsory due process clauses and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process);
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) (2008). This is true "regardless of the relative
strength or weakness of the evidence in the case." State v. Rosenbaum, 449 P.2d 999,
1000 (Utah 1969); see Green, 6 P.2d at 181 ("It is the sole and exclusive province of the
jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state
is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted."). In this case, Mr. McNearney
was charged with second degree burglary of a dwelling. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202(2). At trial, he asked the court to provide instructions to the jury on the lesserincluded offense of burglary of a building, a third degree felony. R. 69-70; 124:147-150.
The trial court denied Mr. McNearney's request. R. 124:147. The trial court also denied
Mr. McNearney the right to present a defense that the house in question was not a
"dwelling" as defined within the burglary statute. R. 124:150-153. The trial court's
rulings were error and Mr. McNearney was entitled to argue to the jury his theory of the
case and have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense.
"[A] defendant is entitled to a requested lesser-included offense instruction if (1)
the two offenses are related because some of their statutory elements overlap . . . ; and (2)
the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense." State v. Evans,
2001 UT 22, H 18, 20 P.3d 888 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)).
Under this "evidence-based" standard, which mirrors Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402, the
trial court must give the requested lesser included offense instruction when either "there
is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question regarding a lesser offense" or
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"when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations,
and one alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the
lesser." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)-(4) (2008).
Under the first prong of this standard, this Court will consider whether the
statutory elements of the two offenses overlap. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. "This will
depend on whether there exist[s] some overlap in the statutory elements of allegedly
'included' offenses and whether "the same facts tend to prove elements of more than one
statutory offense.55 State v. Powell 2007 UT 9,125, 154 P.3d 788 (internal quotation
omitted) (citation omitted); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) ("An offense is so included
when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged[.]55). Burglary is defined in part as
follows:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )-(2) (2008).
As illustrated by the statute above, the elements for burglary of a building and
burglary of a dwelling overlap. Id The exact elements required to be proved beyond a
reasonable for burglary of a building must be proved to the same degree for the offense of
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burglary of a dwelling. Id The only distinction between the two offenses is the element
regarding the type of "building" where the offense took place. Id Because the elements
of the two offenses overlap, Mr. McNearney was entitled to have the jury instructed on
burglary of a building as an alternative basis for conviction.
After determining that the offense of burglary of a building is an offense
"included" in the charged offense, under the second prong of the standard, this Court
must decide if there is a "rational basis" for acquitting the defendant on the greater
offense and convicting him of the lesser. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, U 13, 6 P.3d 1116.
Although a trial court cannot "weigh the credibility of the evidence" in making this
determination, it "must nevertheless decide whether there is 'a sufficient quantum of
evidence' to send this issue to the jury." Id. 114. In doing so, the evidence and
inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. McNearney.
Id. This standard, safeguards the defendant's "right to the presumption of innocence,
maintains the state's burden of proving the defendant's guilt, and reserves the
responsibility of evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence for the jury."
Powell 2007 UT 9, <[ 27. In this case, "a sufficient quantum of evidence" existed to
provide a "rational basis" to support instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of
burglary of a building.
As argued above, the evidence established that the house in question was newly
constructed, vacant, had never been occupied and lacked those accoutrements usual to
habitation. See supra Point I. The plain meaning of the statute and case law support Mr.
McNearney's defense theory that this house, under these circumstances, did not fit the
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statutory definition of being "usually occupied." When viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to Mr. McNearney, sufficient evidence existed to provide a "rational
basis" for acquitting him of burglary of a dwelling and convicting him of the lesser
included offense. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159 (trial court must give jury lesser included
offense instruction when either "there is a sufficient quantum of evidence" or "when the
evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations").
However, after the trial court denied Mr. McNearney's request to instruct the jury on the
lesser included burglary of a building, it denied defense counsel's argument that he was
still entitled to argue to the jury that the house in question was not a "dwelling" as that
element is defined within the statute. R. 124:150-153. The trial court determined that
"[a] home is a dwelling for purposes of the statute" and would so instruct the jury. R.
124:152. In addition to being denied the right to argue the state's evidence failed to
prove the element that this house was a "dwelling" beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial
court erroneously denied Mr. McNearney right to a lesser included jury instruction.
Because whether the house Mr. McNearney was alleged to have entered was a
"dwelling," as that term is defined within the statute, is an element of the offense that
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. McNearney had a right to present a
defense that the statutory elements were not met. £ee United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d
1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The right to present a defense is a 'fundamental element of
due process of law.'" (citation omitted)); Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501(1) (2008) ("[E]ach
element of the offense charged [must be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Utah
Const, art. I, §10 (requiring the jury be unanimous as to every element of offense); In re
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Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (federal due process clause requires each element of
the offense be established beyond a reasonable doubt); Green, 6 P.2d at 181 ("The
provision of our State Constitution which grants accused persons the right to a trial by
jury extends to each and all of the facts which must be found to be present to constitute
the crime charged . . . ."). The trial court violated Mr. McNearney's right to present a
defense and his right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case.
Where sufficient evidence existed to support Mr. McNearney's requests to instruct
the jury on the lesser included offense, the trial court erred in failing to give the requested
instruction and in failing to allow Mr. McNearney to present his defense that the statutory
element of "dwelling" was not establish, was prejudicial. The trial court's error was
prejudicial. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^f 24 ("[H]armless error is an error that is
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the
outcome of the proceedings." (alteration in original)). "When an element of the crime . . .
is in dispute, and the evidence is consistent with both the defendant's and the State's
i

theory of the case, failing to instruct on the lesser included offense presumptively affects
the outcome of the trial. . . [and the Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined."
Id. (omissions in original).

i

If the jury had been properly instructed on burglary of a building, it is likely the
jury would have reached a more favorable result for Mr. McNearney, convicting him of a
third degree rather than a second degree felony. The trial court's error requires this Court
to reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. McNearney respectfully requests that this
court reverse his conviction for burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony and enter a
conviction for burglary of a building, a third degree felony. In the alternative, defendant
requests a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

3>

day of December, 2009.

•A

Debra M. Nelson
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (2008)
§ 76-6-202. Burglary
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of
a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702,5; or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it
is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in Subsections
(l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in the building.

